Вестник Института экономики № 3/2024. Экономика и управление.

Розанова Надежда Михайловна

доктор экономических наук, профессор, сотрудник кафедры микро- и макроэкономического анализа экономического факультета МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова, Москва, Россия

ORCID: 0000-0003-3660-0625

СОВРЕМЕННЫЙ ПОТРЕБИТЕЛЬ: В ТЕНЕТАХ ЦИФРОВОЙ ЭКОНОМИКИ

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Цифровая экономика создает не только новые возможности, но и порождает определенные риски для потребителей. Исследователи отмечают возникновение эффектов запутывания, с помощью которых цифровые экосистемы осуществляют манипулирование оптимизационным выбором индивида в условиях высоких поисковых трансакционных издержек. Межвременной разброс цен и динамическое ценообразование базируются на использовании невнимательности клиентов и их информационной усталости от многочисленных ценовых колебаний. Периодические снижения цен затрудняют индивидам ценовую ориентацию и служат хорошим стимулом для поддержания картельной дисциплины цифровых платформ. Новые ценовые стратегии запутывания не подпадают под действие текущего антимонопольного законодательства и никак не регулируются.

Ключевые слова: потребитель, цифровая экономика, эффекты запутывания.

УДК: 330.342.24

EDN: CEHRSU

DOI: https://doi.org/10.52180/2073-6487_2024_3_26_46

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Дата поступления рукописи: 14.05.2024 г.

Для цитирования:

Розанова Н.М. Современный потребитель: в тенетах цифровой экономики // Вестник Института экономики Российской академии наук. 2024. № 3. С. 26-46. https://doi.org/10.52180/2073-6487_2024_3_26_46 EDN: CEHRSU

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