The Bulletin of the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences № 6/2024.  Economics and Management.

Roman V. Gubarev

Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Associate Professor of the Department of Economic Theory, Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Moscow, Russia

ORCID: 0000-0003-1634-5030

 

Ariz A. Gezalov

Cand. Sci. (Philos.), Leading Researcher, Institute of Sociology of FCTAS RAS, Moscow, Russia

 

Evgeniy I. Dzyuba

Research Associate, Institute of Social and Economic Research of UFRC RAS, Ufa, Russia

ORCID: 0000-0003-2209-2017

 

Aybulat G. Karimov

Cand. Sci. (Sociol.), Acting Director, Institute of Social and Economic Research of UFRC RAS, Ufa, Russia

ORCID: 0000-0002-4185-5377

 

Fanil S. Fayzullin

Dr. Sci. (Philos.), Chief Researcher, Institute of Social and Economic Research of UFRC RAS, Ufa, Russia

ORCID: 0000-0001-8368-4441

 

REMUNERATION OF REGIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS IN RUSSIA: PROPOSALS TO INCREASE LABOR

116-135

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This study is devoted to the consideration of a methodological approach to collective stimulation of the effective work of regional civil servants. Such an approach will allow the first person of any subject of the Russian Federation to increase the real interest of regional civil servants in sustainable development. Taking into account the multi-subject nature of the Russian Federation, the authors propose to consider and adapt the Singapore model to the realities of our country and establish a direct link between the salaries of civil servants of the executive authorities of the Russian regions and the effectiveness of their activities, expressed in indicators of the socio-economic development of the region. The article presents the results of cluster analysis. All subjects of the Russian Federation, based on the actual value of the index, are distributed into three clusters characterized by above average, average and below average levels of efficiency of the executive authorities. The level of incentives (bonuses) for employees depends on two factors - the direct result of regional management, expressed in the index of socio-economic development of the region, and which cluster the region falls into.

Keywords: efficiency of public administration, regional civil servants, wages, collective incentives, executive authorities, regions of Russia.

JEL: J31, J38, C7

EDN: IWDMWJ

DOI: https://doi.org/10.52180/2073-6487_ 2024_6_116_135

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Manuscript submission date: 29.09.2024

 

For citation:

Gubarev R.V., Gezalov A.A., Dzyuba E.I., Karimov A.G., Fayzullin F.S. Remuneration of regional civil servants in Russia: proposals to increase labor // Vestnik Instituta Ekonomiki Rossiyskoy Akademii Nauk. 2024. № 6. Pp. 116-135. (In Russ.). https://doi.org/10.52180/2073-6487_ 2024_6_116_135  EDN: IWDMWJ

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