The article analyzes the dynamics of the main indicators of economic growth in Russia after February 24, 2022, when sanctions pressure on it began to increase. Three periods of economic development under sanctions are identified and the differences between these periods are shown. The changes in the structure of the economy that occurred in 2022-2023 are considered and their reasons are revealed. The factors that ensured the stability of the Russian economy in the face of external shocks are identified, and the prospects for its development are assessed.

The paper examines the impact of the sanctions crisis on oil-exporting economies, using the case of Iran in 2011-2022. It describes effects of the two rounds of collective sanctions — before the conclusion and after the termination of the nuclear deal, as well as in the interim period of lifting the oil embargo. The authors typologize priorities of the Iranian doctrine of “resistance economy” and review its macroeconomic outcomes. They show that despite the successful evasion of sanctions, the development of ties with alternative partners and some advances in diversification, the Iranian economy continues to lose budget revenues and remains unstable, experiencing periodic recessions, devaluations and high inflation. Within the Iranian context, the authors highlight the problem of unbalanced growth under the sanctions stress, as well as vulnerabilities in the growth-supporting strategy based on fiscal stimulus — the issues that hold relevance for Russia.

The article discusses the main trends in the development of Russia’s exports and imports in 2023 under an unprecedented sanctions regime. Having analyzed the dynamics of Russian exports in 2023, taking into account government policy measures to counteract the sanctions pressure (in particular, the price cap on Russian hydrocarbons) and the price situation on the world commodity markets, as well as the dynamics of Russian imports, the author concludes that the domestic foreign trade is highly adaptable to modern realities and relatively resistant to sanctions pressure, partly due to the fact that the "big-country trap" factor is still effective. She formulates proposals to improve state policy measures for the sustainable development of Russia's foreign trade.

Technological innovations of the XXI century are introducing Industry 5.0 into our life, with its special economic characteristics and interfirm activity. The article presents a scientific analysis of the new phenomena generated by Industry 5.0, and the new trends that will determine our economic reality in the next 15–20 years. The robotized mechanistic reality of Industry 4.0 is gradually being replaced by human-oriented, sociocentric, ecological and sustainable human-cobot system, where a human performs the role of a creative participant assisted by a collaborative robot partner. A digital ecosystem is replacing a classical firm, which generates both new possibilities for economic development and new risks in terms of digital monopolization within virtual industries. The optimal balance between profitability and sustainability requires efficient government regulation based on a deep understanding of the nature of Industry 5.0.

In the scientific literature devoted to goal-setting in state governance, the fact of inconsistency of goals is quite often noted. The object of this study is goal-setting in state projects, such as The unified plan for achieving national development goals…, national and federal projects, state programs, etc. The study of the problem allowed the author to propose a typology of inconsistency in the goals of state project administration. In total, 14 different types of goal collisions were identified in the state project administration. Each case of goal inconsistency in state governance requires its own solution, since each of them reduces the quality of state governance. The inconsistency of national, strategic and operational goals within The unified plan… is particularly critical, as it may result in failure to achieve both the strategic goals of individual projects/programs and national goals.

Structuralism is a relatively young area of economic research, but it already has its own history in Russia. The first debates over the rates and proportions of the Soviet economy began back in the 1920s. The discussions between “geneticists” and “teleologists” were quite open then. Geneticists defended the traditionalist approach, relying on the exhaustion of the restoration impulse and the need to return the country to “normal”, average world growth rates and the accumulation rate of 16-18%. Teleologists relied on the “law of socialist accumulation” and the “theory of two regulators”. They were confident in the possibilities of accelerated development; even the “starting version” of the 1st Five-Year Plan provided for achieving an accumulation rate of more than 20%. And in the end, despite the monstrous mistakes the Bolshevik leadership made during collectivization, the teleologists turned out to be right. The 2nd Five-Year Plan was more successful — the planned savings rate was reduced, the production of consumer goods was increased, and it was possible to switch from cards to planned trade turnover. The idea of accelerated development and the discovery of the law of socialist accumulation belonged to E. Preobrazhensky, but its implementation, including through planned calculations, was carried out by S. Strumilin, and starting from the 3rd Five-Year Plan — by N. Voznesensky.

The end of the post-war period and the death of I. Stalin marked the end of “adaptive modernization”. The 8th Five-Year Plan, which aimed for faster growth of Group B industries over Group A, failed to be fulfilled. By the end of the 1970s the Soviet economy fell into inevitable stagnation. Economists of that time gave alarmist forecasts about the decline in growth rates, and proposed measures to overcome the crisis, but all of those were palliative in nature. The structuralist theory of multi-level economy by Yu. Yaremenko appeared at the same time. This theory contained a number of provisions that could be called heretical, contradicting both Marxism and the neoclassical mainstream. Despite its fruitfulness, it was ignored by both planners and Soviet leaders.

The article discusses the following topics: trends in the development of trade relations between the CEE countries and Russia, participation of these countries in the economic war between Russia and the West, the impact of sanctions on economic relations of the CEE countries with Russia, the processes of circumventing sanctions and organizing schemes for exporting dual-use goods to Russia, and the withdrawal of CEE companies from Russia. Particular attention is paid to the consequences of both the energy crisis and the restructuring of resource supply chains for the economies of CEE countries. It is concluded that anti-Russian sanctions and the energy crisis have caused more significant damage to the economies of CEE countries compared to most other EU countries, and that there are little chances for the restoration of economic ties between Russia and CEE countries in the current geopolitical situation.

The article examines the state and problems of the Italian agriculture in the context of the transition to technological structure 4.0. The author examines the targets of the EU common agricultural policy at the present stage, the advantages and limitations of the Italian agriculture in the context of the goals and objectives of the ecological transition, and measures of state support for its modernization. Data from expert studies on Italy’s progress towards sustainable agriculture are presented. A conclusion is made about the tangible impact of national conditions on the course of technological restructuring.

The article is devoted to analyzing the logistics of parallel imports, which has become one of the most relevant and popular ways of Russia's foreign trade activity in the current geopolitical situation, after the introduction of economic sanctions by Western countries in the spring of 2022. In the article, the author considers 4 types of schemes that allow participants in foreign economic activity to reduce logistics costs, and also analyzes the trade turnover and relations of the Russian Federation with the countries through which parallel imports are carried out, such as Turkey, China and India, as well as possible prospects for cooperation with them in the future. The author analyzes the mechanism of parallel imports in the automotive sector, thanks to which little-known Chinese brands began to appear on the Russian market. An actual logistics route in the scheme of parallel imports between Russia and India is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which will reduce not only costs, but also the delivery time of goods. In conclusion, the author offers recommendations that can help not only strengthen the country's economy, but also develop relations with friendly states.